Past research suggests that majority evaluations of welfare deservingness are structured along ethnic dividing lines. The fact that poverty and immigrant status are highly associated across Europe's increasingly ethnically diverse societies may thus lead majorities to withdraw support from welfare programs that transfer money to people who are different from themselves. Utilizing measures of general welfarism, most prior studies have not addressed the interplay between attitudes toward immigrants and support for specific welfare types that rely on different notions of entitlement and attract varying levels of take-up among natives and immigrants.
Introduction
Since Alesina and Glaesner's seminal publication in 2004, a range of studies have investigated the relationship between immigration-induced heterogeneity and majority support for the welfare state (cf. Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013) .
Attitudes toward immigrants are often regarded as important intermediaries, explaining the largely negative association. Much research has thus also addressed the link between majorities' stance on redistribution and racial prejudice in the USA (Fox 2004; Gilens 2000) and various expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe (see e.g. Ford 2006; Gorodzeisky 2013; Senik et al. 2009 ). Most of these studies have utilized measures of generalized welfarism, such as the endorsement of equality and a broader concern with helping the poor. However, this approach may mask important differences in support patterns across specific types of welfare (Schmidt-Catran and Spies [forthcoming] ). Especially means-tested as opposed to contributory or universal forms of welfare give rise to pronounced struggles over entitlement and benefit natives and immigrants to different degrees (Crepaz and Damron 2009; Rothstein and Stolle 2003) . Moreover, European majorities' support for the various arenas of welfare provision has been shown to be closely linked to their views on the deservingness of primary recipient groups (van Oorschot 2006) . Consequently, studying attitudes toward welfare types is important to derive a more differentiated view on which aspects of the welfare state might struggle to retain popular support 1 in the face of increasing ethnic heterogeneity and anti-immigrant sentiment.
This paper asks to what extent two types of anti-immigrant sentiment relate to native-born Germans' support for government intervention to assist three distinct socially vulnerable groups -the unemployed, the old, and the sick. Germany is an especially interesting context within which to answer this question because it combines the comparatively pronounced presence of anti-immigrant sentiment 1 Some prior research even suggests that certain types of welfare may gain support from constituencies that harbor affectively negative attitudes toward immigrants, but simultaneously fear economic displacement due to immigrant competition (cf. Burgoon et al. 2012; Finseraas 2008) . While this socalled compensation hypothesis should not be discounted, the present article limits itself to assessing whether concerns about the erosion of majority welfare state support are warranted (also see Section 6). (Decker et al. 2012; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006) with markedly different patterns of welfare use among native and non-native residents across meanstested and contributory as well as universal welfare programs (Engels et al. 2011) .
Using data from the 2006 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) I find that anti-immigrant sentiment, expressed as affective prejudice, is indeed associated with lowered support for government intervention to assist the unemployed. At the same time, support for oldage and sickness assistance does not appear to be related to levels of ethnic prejudice.
This then implies that those who harbor prejudice oppose means-tested aid that does benefit a notably large number of non-natives, but embrace contributory and universal programs that predominantly benefit native recipients. Interestingly, neither of these associations is dependent on the belief that non-natives impose an (economic) burden upon the social system. This points to the relevance of negative affect beyond subjectively rational motives.
Anti-immigrant sentiment and support for the welfare state
Past research has identified two main pathways through which attitudes toward immigrants may lead to a decline in native majorities' support for social welfare.
The first pathway assumes that in-group biases render natives inclined to feel less solidarity and more social distance toward non-Western immigrants in particular, raising opposition to their inclusion in the welfare system. Commonly defined as the preferential treatment of those who are similar to oneself on one or more salient dimensions, such as race, religion, or language, a long line of research in social psychology has confirmed the importance of in-group bias for how individuals choose to allocate resources (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1970) . Criteria along which in-and out-groups are defined depend heavily on the object of competition between the groups at hand (Tajfel 1970) . In-group biases and negative out-group sentiment based on ethnic dividing lines may thus rise to particular salience in shaping natives' attitudes toward welfare programs that are perceived to overly benefit immigrants.
That is, if poverty, welfare dependency, and immigrant status become associated, the majority can be aroused to embrace welfare chauvinistic ideals of 'welfare for us but not them' (Alesina and Glaesner 2004: 134) .
In line with the in-group/out-group argument, comparative studies have revealed that most European societies share a common deservingness culture, according to which majorities consider the (native) elderly to be most entitled to government assistance, followed by the sick, and placing immigrants at the very bottom of the entitlement scale (cf. van Oorschot 2006) . Studies addressing this welfare chauvinism have often investigated majorities' inclination to exclude less qualified, non-Western labor immigrants and asylum seekers in particular from accessing social rights -a tendency which appears to be widespread among European and American majorities (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Helbling and Krisi 2014) , albeit with great variation across societies. For instance, Scheepers et al. (2002) find that native-born Germans, Austrians, Danes, and Belgians are notably more likely to favor excluding foreign residents from social rights than natives in 11 other European countries (also see Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009 ). Taking the case of Israel, Gorodzeisky (2013) shows that majority respondents' willingness to exclude nonJewish workers from accessing basic social rights is conditionally dependent on their prejudicial views toward the immigrant population.
Rather than studying welfare chauvinism as natives' desire to merely exclude immigrants, few studies have considered the consequences of negative out-group sentiment for European majority support for the welfare state in general. Ford (2006) shows that Britons who admit to being prejudiced against people of other races are significantly less favorable toward redistribution at large. Albeit looking at less clearly affective expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment, Finseraas (2008) also finds that native-born citizens across European societies are less likely to support redistribution, if they believe that immigrants do not integrate well culturally and should be kept from accessing social rights.
A second channel of influence discussed in the literature suggests that it might rather be natives' cognitive response to the reality of immigration-induced heterogeneity that lowers their support for the welfare state. Specifically, majority citizens' concern with immigrants' use of welfare and costs to the social system appear to be of importance, as they represent 'the material dimension of [the intergroup] conflict' (Crepaz and Damron 2009: 439) . Fong et al. (2006) show that people revise their willingness to help the poor if they perceive them as cheating the system or failing to contribute. People who feel that immigrants take undue advantage of and hence place a burden upon the welfare state can thus be expected to be less supportive of means-tested programs in particular, as those are not based on prior contributions (also see Section 3).
Stating that negative attitudes toward immigrants can be based on cognition rather than affect does of course not imply that they necessarily represent objectively true facts. In the absence of relevant personal experience, stereotyping attitudes, such as the belief that immigrants generally impose a burden upon the welfare state, are informed by trusted sources, such as friends and media reports (Rydgren 2004 ).
Indeed, looking at 15 European countries, Schmidt and Spies (2014) find that the notion of immigrants' benefitting more from welfare than they contribute only limits majority support for redistribution if political parties emphasize such claims. Because individuals use these same third-party informed, generalizing, and efficient modes of reasoning as they navigate most aspects of their daily lives, ethnic stereotypes may appear subjectively rational, given the cognitive confines of the individual (Hamilton and Trolier 1986) . However, as Rydgren (2008) demonstrates in his study of radical right-wing voters in six European countries, individuals' affective and cognitive responses to the presence of immigrants do not always overlap, and those believing that immigrants generally place an unjustifiably high burden upon the welfare budget do not necessarily also hold affectively negative attitudes against them. The two types of anti-immigrant sentiment should hence be treated as distinct concepts, especially when studying their relevance for majorities' support for the welfare state.
While subjectively rational stereotypes may matter beyond and independent of prejudice (suggesting a net effect), research in social psychology also suggests that individuals tend to use their prejudices as heuristics in assessing situations (Pratkanis 2014 (Pratkanis [1989 ). When asked to judge the behavior of a white taxi driver who refused to accept a black client, participants in an experiment conducted by Khan and Lambert (2001) were more likely to regard the driver's behavior as rational rather than discriminatory if they harbored negative prejudice against blacks. Their knowledge that blacks are more often involved in crime than other racial groups led them to stereotype the black customer as a potential criminal, rendering the driver's refusal appropriate, and indicating a mediation of prejudice via subjective rationality.
However, thinking of welfare again, it may equally be the case that natives who are negatively prejudiced must also belief that immigrants abuse the social aid system to make their prejudice matter for their views on welfare (cf. Peffley et al. 1997; Schmidt and Spies 2014) . This then suggests an interaction (moderation) among the two types of anti-immigrant sentiment. A number of studies have investigated this interplay of anti-immigrant attitudes:
Larsen (2011) studies two measures of majority attitudes toward blacks in the USA, and non-Western immigrants in the UK, Sweden, and Denmark. The first measure is affective, asking whether respondents would mind living in a neighborhood where half of the population belonged to the relevant out-group. The second one reflects a (subjectively rational) stereotype, pertaining to the out-group's work ethic. Negative attitudes along both affective and subjectively rational dimensions appear to significantly lower support for government spending on assistance for immigrants in particular as well as redistribution in general. The relationships seem to be as strong in the three European countries as in the USA.
Gorodzeisky (2013) (Finseraas 2008 ).
Based on their finding that even within the German conservative welfare state the regional share of immigrants is significantly negatively associated with generalized majority support for redistribution over time, Schmidt-Catran and Spies (forthcoming) conclude that the relationship is 'not mediated by the national welfare regime at all' but that inter-program differences are likely at the heart of the observed relationship. Whether the negative association may in fact be driven by Germans' opposition to means-tested aid for the unemployed rather than the welfare state at
large remains an open question, which is addressed in the analyses presented here.
Second and directly related, welfare programs differ in terms of how much natives and non-natives actually benefit (cf. Figure 1 ). As discussed earlier, it seems likely that negative sentiment against non-native out-groups is relevant only to majority support for those welfare programs that are actually perceived to be used by immigrants. Rendering support for this line of reasoning, Gilens (2000) shows that white Americans are highly supportive of welfare programs that require previous contribution and benefit favored groups (e.g. the elderly). Only when it is understood as the kind of need-based aid from which black citizens benefit more than any other ethnic group, does welfare meet opposition among prejudiced whites, who consider blacks to be lazy and unmotivated to help themselves. Gilens thus concludes that American welfare attitudes are ethnicized, that is, that deservingness is tied to ethnicity or, rather, to being a member of the white majority.
[ Figure 1 about here] immigrants tend to face significantly higher morbidity risks than the German majority, this group is also much less likely to use the public healthcare system for both preventive and acute care services (Kohls 2011) . Taken together, these takeup patterns reveal that the old-age pension and health pillars of the German welfare 3 The German Federal Statistical Office defines individuals with a migration background as those who were born abroad, born in Germany as foreign nationals, or born in Germany as German citizens with at least one foreign-born parent. The category 'foreign nationals born in Germany' arises from the fact that German citizenship is granted primarily on the basis of parental citizenship (jus sanguinis).
system do not only attract the largest shares of government social spending, but also include the kinds of transfers that mainly benefit natives.
Like in many other countries, immigrant status and socioeconomic disadvantage are associated in Germany as well. While less than half of all nativeborn Germans (43%) drew their principal income from employment, the share of gainfully working residents with a migration background was even lower, at 36%.
Consequently, non-natives were twice as likely to received long-term unemployed aid (ALG II) and other means-tested assistance compared to natives (cf. Engels et al. 2011 ). However, it should be pointed out that the share of non-natives relying on their own families rather than the government to cover the majority of their financial needs exceeds that of the native population by a factor of almost two as well. This reveals an important source of economic self-sufficiency, which is largely overlooked in Surveys performed by major polling agencies point to consistently high levels of agreement with the statement that Muslim residents in particular place a burden on the German social system because of their alleged unwillingness to work and adapt culturally (Hierl 2012 ). Yet, disconfirming common preconceptions regarding immigrants' preference for welfare over employment, Castronova et al. (2001) use German panel data to conclusively demonstrate that immigrants are not more likely to claim means-tested benefits than native-born Germans with similar socioeconomic profiles. They are just more likely to be and remain unemployed.
Overall, German majority attitudes toward immigration and non-native residents used to be amongst the most negative in Europe throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s (Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006) , and recent reports confirm that xenophobic sentiments continue to spread, especially in East Germany (Decker et al. 2012) . The heightened presence of such attitudes coupled with pronouncedly different patterns of welfare use among native and non-native residents make Germany an interesting setting within which to study the nexus between anti-immigrant sentiment and program-specific support for the welfare state. Based on the discussion of insights from prior research and the characteristics of the German case, the following hypotheses are derived for empirical testing:
Because the division between users and non-users is clearly identifiable and marked by unequal take-up among natives and non-natives in Germany, ethnic ingroup preferences are likely to matter for support for means-tested aid in particular (pathway 1 -in-group bias). Specifically, I hypothesize that 
Data and Method
Data sets adequate to studying the relationship between both affective and subjectively rational expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment and specific types of 
Welfare attitudes in Germany
The dependent variables included in the regression models presented here capture attitudes toward state intervention to provide a decent standard of living or adequate care for the unemployed, the old, and the sick respectively. consistently more supportive of all types of welfare programs (Lippl 2001; Mau 2001) . This is also reflected in the ALLBUS data, especially when it comes to assistance for the unemployed:
There is a near consensus among all native respondents regarding the government's responsibility to provide health care for the sick and a decent standard of living for the old. By contrast, as many as 8 and 27% of all West Germans thought that the government should never or not be required to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed. Though to a lesser degree, East Germans are also much less likely to regard the state as the legitimate provider of assistance for the unemployed, with 3% choosing the 'never' and 17% selecting the 'not responsible' categories. Similarly, though not shown here, only 30% of all German respondents would support an increase in government spending on aid for the jobless, while 51% favor higher spending on old-age pensions and 62% believe that the state should invest more to subsidize health care (ALLBUS/ISSP 2006; own calculations).
German welfare preferences are thus clearly differentiated by program and recipient types, with support for unemployment aid -Germany's primary meanstested form of welfare -being much lower than attitudes toward any other large area 6 As multiple regression analysis requires the independence of observations, untreated data clustering may lead to an underestimation of standard errors and spuriously significant effects (Hox 1995 (Mau 2001: 24-25) .
Ethnic prejudice and subjective rationality
A similar socialization vs. self-interest debate exists over how to explain the consistently higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment among East as opposed to
West Germans (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013; Raijman et al. 2003). While some blame the virtual absence of integration efforts in the GDR (Bade and Oltmer 2004), others attribute higher levels of negative out-group sentiment to the insecurities and status losses incurred by many East Germans since the reunification (Friedrich 2001).
Whichever explanation is more valid, socialization in East Germany is one of the most crucial controls included in this study, as it has the capacity to influence the three outcome variables and the predictors of main interest.
7
Affective prejudice toward non-natives is measured on an additive scale of three items that ask respondents to rate the extent to which they would mind if a Turk, an Aussiedler, or an asylum seeker married into their family. The overall scale ranges from 1 to 7, where higher values signify a greater desire for social distance. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.88 was obtained for the ethnic prejudice scale, indicating excellent reliability.
7 Separate analyses for East and West Germany are not possible, due to the limited number of cases.
Furthermore, an additional geographic control (interacted with the two measures of anti-immigrant sentiment), capturing the percentage of foreign residents as a share of the total population in respondents' districts of residence (Kreis), did neither achieve statistical significance, nor notably affect the overall model fit, the observed associations' significance or their magnitude. Albeit repeatedly linked to levels of nativist resentment (McLaren 2003; Quillian 1995; Wagner et al. 2003) , the relationship between ethnic prejudice and welfare preferences does not appear to be sensitive to contextual diversity. The diversity indicators were thus not included in the final regression models and are not presented here. German attitudes toward these three non-native groups were the most negative, both compared to other non-native groups within Germany, such as Italian or Vietnamese communities (Appelbaum 2002) and, in the case of Turks, compared to how other
European majorities feel about their largest domestic minorities (Pettigrew 1998 ).
The ALLBUS 2006 also asked respondents to rate their agreement with the statement that 'foreigners who live in Germany are a burden to the social welfare system' (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). 8 I use this item to capture the subjective rationality of anti-immigrant sentiment, that is, the notion that there is an undue economic cost attached to the presence of foreigners. Since the survey was conducted in German, it should be noted that the German word for 'foreigner'
(Ausländer) can refer to both first-and second-generation immigrants, making it likely that respondents considered both as a joint non-native out-group. If it is true that ethnic prejudice only lowers majorities' support for particular welfare programs because benefits are perceived to disproportionately benefit non-native claimants, the effect should be conditional on holding the belief that non-natives do impose a burden upon the social system (Hypothesis 2, Appendix 4 and Models 1−3C).
Albeit statistically significant, the correlation between the two measures of anti-immigrant sentiment is very moderate in magnitude (r = 0.34), supporting the assumption that both represent distinct concepts. Yet, as explained in section 2, associations between the subjectively rational form of anti-immigrant sentiment and support for the three types of government intervention (Hypotheses 4 and 5, Models 1−3B) should be considered with care, as questions of endogeneity and causal 8 The survey contains six questions pertaining to the impact of foreign residents on the German economy and welfare state (e.g. whether they 'take away/create jobs' or 'help to finance the pension system'). However, because these items are only weakly correlated (0.2 < r > 0.5) and hence not satisfactorily scalable, I rely on the single-item measure instead. In substantive terms, asking whether immigrants are perceived to be 'a burden to the social system' also gets most directly at the notion of welfare chauvinism, rather than e.g. economic threat (cf. Finseraas 2008; Schmidt and Spies 2014) , that is of primary interest in the present analysis.
ordering that cannot be addressed in the cross-sectional set-up of this study. At least from a theoretical perspective, the causal pathway between prejudice to welfare preferences (Hypotheses 1 and 3, Models 1−3A) seems much clearer, though all results presented below should of course be regarded as associations, rather than effects.
In line with prior research on the determinants of welfare attitudes, measures of individual stakeholder status, such as income and labor market position, are taken into account, as are factors of socialization, such as age, gender, and education, as well as political alignment. Appendices 1 and 2 provide descriptions and summary statistics for all independent variables considered in the analyses.
Results
Tables 1−3 present nine ordered logistic regression models that were specified to explore how affective and subjectively rational expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment relate to native-born Germans' support for government intervention to assist the unemployed, the elderly, and the sick.
[ Table 1 about here]
Confirming Hypothesis 1, the bivariate relationship between ethnic prejudice and support for government assistance for the unemployed is negative and significant at the five-percent level (Appendix 3). The association gains in strength and significance as controls for economic self-interest, socialization, and political ideology are added to the model (Table 1 , Model 1A). The predicted probability 9 of stating that the government should always be responsible for the provision of aid to the unemployed (outcome = 4) is merely 9% among those who express the strongest opposition to having a non-native marry into their family (with a score of 7 on the prejudice scale), while it is 21% for those who are least prejudiced (with a score of 1; not shown). In other words, the least prejudiced are more than twice as likely to fully support government assistance for the unemployed compared to those with the strongest desire for social distance from ethnic out-groups.
Comparing predicted probabilities across the significant associations in Model 1A, the relationship between ethnic prejudice and support for government intervention to assist the jobless appears to be among the strongest. The only predictor associated with a larger change in support probabilities is unemployment itself. However, the difference in 'effect' size is not large: the predicted probability of unemployed respondents to regard the government as fully responsible exceeds that of working ones by a factor of only 2.5 (30 vs. 12%).
In line with prior research, East Germans' probability of fully supporting government intervention to assist the unemployed is significantly higher, at 19%, than that of their Western compatriots, at 11%. Members of trade unions are also nearly twice as likely to favor the government as mainly responsible for the unemployed (22%), compared to non-unionized respondents (12%). The statistically significant associations observed in Model 1A thus confirm the existence of an East-West divide as well as the importance of self-interest and political alignment as shapers of social policy preferences beyond ethnic prejudice. Yet, these alternative explanations neither rule out the independent relevance of affectively negative out-group sentiment nor does the strength of their associations appear to be much larger in substantive terms.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the negative association between prejudice and support for government-provided unemployment assistance does not appear to be moderated by, that is, vary across levels of the subjectively rational assumption that foreign residents impose an economic burden upon the social system. This is reflected in the finding that the interaction between the two types of anti-immigrant sentiment does not achieve statistical significance for support for assistance for the unemployed; the same holds true for support for the old and the sick (cf. Appendix 4).
[ Figure 3 about here]
Shedding further light on the relationship between ethnic prejudice and concerns about immigrants' burdening the welfare state, Model 1C in Table 1 shows that the two anti-immigrant sentiment variables are both independently, negatively associated with the outcome, though the subjectively rational version achieves significance at the 10-percent level only (also see Model 1B). However, the difference in support probabilities related to changes in the level of ethnic prejudice is larger than that associated with varying levels of agreement with the burden statement ( Figure 3, Model 1C) . Compared to the most prejudiced respondents, those desiring the least social distance are twice as likely to fully support state intervention assisting the unemployed. By contrast, those who are completely convinced that non-natives do impose economic strain are only 0.7 times less likely to regard the state as primarily responsible for the jobless than those who do not view immigrants as a burden to the welfare state at all. Yet, the difference in support probabilities between respondents harboring the strongest anti-immigrant sentiments on both affective and subjectively rational dimensions is very small (at 10 and 11%, respectively).
Nevertheless, the independently significant association of ethnic prejudice renders surprising support to the importance of affect and differential altruism as potential shapers of native support for means-tested welfare in particular, exceeding subjectively rational, economic concerns.
Finally, it remains to be established whether ethnic prejudice (Hypothesis 3) and subjective rationality (Hypothesis 5) are indeed less strongly, if at all, associated with support for assistance for the old and the sick, compared to unemployment aid.
To do so, I formally test whether the difference between the coefficients of the two anti-immigrant sentiment variables is equal to zero across models 1-3C (last column in Tables 1, 2, and 3) 10 . The resulting adjusted Wald test statistics (not shown here)
are statistically significant, allowing me to reject the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and support for the unemployed is equal to that between prejudice and the elderly or the sick. This is the case for the subjective rationality measure as well. While this renders a first instance of support for Hypotheses 3 and 5, visual cross-model comparison further refines the findings:
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here] As expected, Tables 2 and 3 show that there is no statistically significant relationship between levels of ethnic prejudice and support for government intervention to assist the sick and the old -the two main recipient groups of Germany's largest universal and contributory welfare programs (Models 2A and 3A) . This is so both before and after the controls are introduced to the models (cf.
Appendix 3).
Albeit substantively weaker than and statistically significantly different from its negative association with support for the unemployed, the relationship between levels of agreement with the 'immigrants are a burden' statement and support for the state as a care giver for the elderly (p=.056; Models 2B) and the sick (p=.052; Model 3B) is, surprisingly, positive. However, the positive associations do not turn out to be the largest in substantive terms, especially compared to the education variables. When it comes to old-age assistance, those holding an academic high school degree have two times higher odds of being in a lower support category compared to those with primary education. The predicted probability of being fully supportive of the government's responsibility for the old is equal to 50% for those with primary and 30% for those with academic-track, upper secondary education, implying a delta of 20 percentage points. By comparison, the difference in propensities for the highest level of support (Model 2B outcome=maximum value) associated with the lowest (1) and highest (7) levels of agreement with the burden statement amounts to only 10 percentage points.
At face value, the finding that perceiving immigrants as a burden to the social system is significantly negatively associated with support for the government's responsibility to care for the unemployed (Model 1B, supporting Hypothesis 4), but positively associated with support for old-age and sickness assistance (Models 2B and 3B) implies a startling degree of welfare chauvinism: greater concern with the economic viability of non-natives among the claimants of welfare not only implies the contestation of largely means-tested unemployment aid that benefits a substantial number of non-Germans. It is also associated with heightened endorsement of two programs whose recipients are predominantly native. However, as mentioned before, this interpretation should be regarded with care. It is unclear whether natives do in fact base their program support on their concern with immigration-induced strains or whether those who are especially fond of the welfare state are more likely to be concerned with immigration as one potential threat to the continued viability of generous social systems. Even so, the fact that the theoretically more intuitive association between ethnic prejudice and preferences for government intervention turns out to be negative for unemployment and nil for old-age and sickness assistance suggests the presence of welfare chauvinism in its own right: independent of subjectively rational concerns, respondents desiring greater social distance from ethnic out-groups are significantly less likely to support aid for the unemployed, among whom individuals with a migration background are over-represented (Model 1C). At the same time, their prejudice has no bearing on support for universal as well as contributory programs that are not connected to notably large non-native recipient groups.
Finally, it should be noted that even the fully controlled models leave a large part of the observed variation in government intervention preferences unexplained, with pseudo R 2 values ranging between 3 and 6%. Albeit low in absolute terms, the 
Conclusions
This study sought to investigate how anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare attitudes are linked among members of the German majority public. Contrary to frequently raised concerns, my analyses do not suggest a link between anti-immigrant sentiment and generalized opposition to state-funded welfare, at least in Germany.
While ethnic prejudice is associated with significantly lowered propensities to support aid for the unemployed (Germany's primary means-tested form of government assistance), it bears no significance for natives' position on aid for the sick and the elderly. Interestingly, the relationships appear to be independent of the extent to which natives believe that foreign residents impose an economic burden upon the welfare system. The magnitude of the negative association between prejudice and support for unemployment assistance also exceeds that between the outcome and the notion of immigrants as a burden. The results thus suggest the importance of negative affect as a potential shaper of native support for means-tested welfare, beyond presumably more rational, economic concerns. Despite these results, it is important to stress that ethnic prejudice does not constitute the sole or strongest predictor of support for government assistance to the jobless. The magnitude of the association is matched, but largely not exceeded, by that of labor force status, union membership, and socialization in East Germany.
While this underlines the importance of prejudice, welfare state solidarity among members of the German majority should nevertheless not be described as primarily ethnicized, as was found to be the case in the US. More sophisticated survey instruments should be developed to scrutinize and qualify the findings presented here.
Panel data sources will be especially crucial to better understand the relationship between subjectively rational concerns with the economic dimension of immigration and natives' support for various types of welfare.
Moreover, future research should explore the interplay of ethnic prejudice and dimensions of subjectively rational attitudes toward immigrants other than the burden statement used here. For instance, in his afore-mentioned study, Finseraas (2008) finds that natives who fear that immigrants will take their job or lower their income are actually more supportive of redistribution, as they seek compensation for the increasing insecurities caused by the presence of immigrant competitors (Finseraas 2008 ; also see Burgoon et al. 2012) . To limit its scope, the paper at hand focused on studying the interplay of two types on anti-immigrant sentiment in their association with majority support for three types of welfare, to assess whether concerns about the erosion of welfare state endorsement at large are warranted.
Whether prejudice might actually be associated with an increased support for certain kinds of social insurance in individuals afraid of economic losses due to immigration remains to be studied.
The paper underlines the importance of taking the dimensionality of welfare and redistribution preferences seriously, especially when trying to understand the role of anti-immigrant sentiment. Measures of generalized welfarism often mask substantial variation across types of government assistance, which remains uncaptured in studies utilizing cross-country comparisons to contrast predominantly universal with conservative or liberal, means-testing welfare regime types as well. To further our understanding of the native/non-native divide as a source of differential welfare state support, research would thus not only benefit from the use of more finegrained measures of welfare attitudes but also from in-depth accounts of national discourses and resulting frames of entitlement. Tables   0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90% 
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